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3  Alexis de Tocqueville: The Psychologist of Equality
What is the relation between equality and
liberty? While now the word democracy generally is
used to refer to liberal democracy - the adjective is
implicit - the relationship between liberty and
equality is neither historically nor theoretically
uncontroversial. In its original form, the democracy
of Ancient Greece, freedom was neither universal nor
guaranteed even to its citizens. In Aristotle’s
definition, democracy means merely rule of the many,
or rule by the people, a regime that seeks its
justification in the principle of equality. How the
people will  rule is another question, an ambiguity
that is best demonstrated by the fact that a
democratic Athens put Socrates to death. In
contemporary debates about the nature of liberalism,
the tension between liberalism and democracy is
presented in other ways.  Often, it is seen as a
philosophical conflict stemming from a general point
4about the plurality of values. 1 Or, it is presented as
a conflict at a less abstract level, one that results
from questions of distributive justice, and one that
appears in debates about questions of varieties of
affirmative action, and more generally about all
redistributive policies. 2
Alexis de Tocqueville is often enlisted in this
debate, as an illustration of this apparent tension
between liberty and equality. For example, Stephen
Lukes writes that Tocqueville presents a sociological
generalisation about the “irreconcilable conflict”
between equality and liberty, how equality “poses
several likely dangers to the survival of liberty.” 3
Nonetheless, despite the observations of those such
as Lukes, we shall find that Tocqueville to the
contrary, does not present an irreconcilable conflict
between equality and liberty.  To the contrary, he
argues the relation between the two principles is
undetermined. Equality both may or may not coexist
side by side with liberty. In studying Tocqueville,
the interesting question is not whether there is a
conflict between equality and liberty, but rather how
5it is that equality may support two such divergent
political outcomes.
Equality and the Need for a New Political Science
Tocqueville tells us that he writes in times of a
global democratic revolution, where “the gradual
progress of equality is fated, permanent, and daily
passing beyond human control.” 4 Yet despite this
recognition of historical inevitability, Tocqueville
famously demands that “a new political science is
needed for a world itself quite new.” 5  This new world
is the emerging world of democracy.  But why does it
require a new political science?
 Tocqueville’s assertion is puzzling because there
are reasons to think why a political science would no
longer be necessary at all. The ground for the new
world of liberal democracies was prepared by
appealing to nature, to read within it the rights -
the natural rights it guarantees, to liberty,
equality and human dignity. Locke writes in his
Second Treatise  (1689) “there is nothing more
6evident” than that men “should also be equal one
amongst one another” and that “reason...teaches all
Mankind who will but consult it,” that we are “all
equal and independent” creatures. 6 Similarly, the
American Declaration of Independence begins with the
phrase , “We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, and that they have
certain inalienable rights... to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness.” These rights are self-
evident or obvious: to recognise them, all that is
required is to consult nature. But if this legitimacy
is natural, then why does Tocqueville tell us that
science, or something that is created by man, needed
to be added to nature?
We can approach this question by trying to
understand what Tocqueville means by the word
equality. He cautions that “an abstract word is like
a box with a false bottom; you can put in it what
ideas you please and take them out again unobserved.” 7
And indeed, Tocqueville himself has been taken to
task with his own warning words, criticised for
imprecision in his references to equality. 8
7Nonetheless, there are two most important ways in
which Tocqueville uses the term. He describes
equality as the equality of social conditions - or
the absence of any fixed social hierarchy that would
separate human beings from one another. But more
significantly for his thesis of how equality may lead
to opposing political results, he also describes
equality as a passion. And this passion manifests
itself in two forms:
There is indeed a manly and legitimate passion for equality
which rouses in all men a desire to be strong and respected.
This passion tends to elevate the little man to the rank of
the great.  But the human heart also nourishes a debased taste
for equality, which leads the weak to want to drag the strong
down to their level, and which induces men to prefer equality
in servitude to inequality in freedom. 9
Thus, for Tocqueville, though a social state may be
democratic, there are two chief political
consequences to which it may lead: either freedom or
tyranny.  However, the road to servitude is not at
all obvious, it leads there “by a more roundabout and
secret road.” 10  And hence the necessity for a new
political science.
8Democracy and Tyranny
Tocqueville is not the first to point to the
relationship between democracy and tyranny.
Montesquieu’s famous chapter on extreme equality in
his Spirit of the Laws  is usually cited as one of the
cardinal intellectual influences on Tocqueville’s
theory of tyranny. 11 Nonetheless, while Tocqueville’s
debt to Montesquieu is well documented, 12 we can also
better understand Tocqueville by reference to a
thinker with whom he is less often compared: Plato. 13
In Book VIII of the Republic , Plato offers a theory
of corruption and revolution, and like Tocqueville,
he too claims that democracies naturally decay into
tyranny. According to Plato, excess destroys every
regime: revolutions occur when a regime departs from
its ruling principle, when this principle becomes
corrupted through excess. For example, oligarchies,
or the rule of the rich, are destroyed when wealth
turns into greed.  Similarly, democracies come undone
when their governing principle, freedom, is
transformed into license.
9However, Tocqueville differs from Plato, both in
claiming that in democracies the passion for equality
is stronger than the passion for freedom, and in
holding that rather than destroyed by excessive zeal
for freedom, democracy is corrupted by its opposite:
indifference to freedom. Tocqueville presents this
argument in three parts in the chapter Why Democratic
Nations Show a More Ardent And Enduring Love For
Equality Than For Liberty. First, he says that in
democracies the desire for equality rather than
freedom is fundamental, because freedom is not what
is distinctive to such regimes - freedom can be found
in different places and in different forms. But this
merely an argument about uniqueness, not about value;
though liberty may not be exclusive to it says
nothing about how democracies value it. Second,
Tocqueville tells us that democratic peoples are
extremely attached to equality because they think it
will last forever; equality is valued because it is
assumed to be eternal. But this is not a very
persuasive psychological account of motivation: it
does not seem particularly convincing to claim that
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the reason why something is loved or desired is
because it is thought it will last forever. To the
contrary, desire is customarily understood as fuelled
by the opposite motive, in recognition of the
fleeting nature of its object.  In fact, this is a
lesson which Tocqueville elsewhere himself admits:
“that which most vividly stirs the human heart is not
the quiet possession of something precious, but
rather the imperfectly satisfied desire to have it
and the continual fear of losing it again.” 14  Lastly,
Tocqueville argues that the pleasures of political
liberty are only enjoyed infrequently and even then
only by the few. Furthermore, such liberty demands
sacrifice and effort, while equality, to the
contrary, is easy: it “daily gives each man in the
crowd a host of small enjoyments,” and “offers its
pleasures for free.” 15 For this reason it is more
highly valued.  But how do we value those who are
free?  And do we love those who are easy?
Because Tocqueville’s argument in this central
chapter is not very convincing, some interpreters
have looked for other explanations, for example,
11
holding his position to be simply the expression of
an aristocrat’s contemptuous view of the masses,
particularly the new rising middle class. 16 But
Tocqueville’s argument about how equality lowers
human aspiration, and so threatens freedom, is much
more complex. Rather than dismissing his account as
an implausible one, we must look further in order to
understand it. We need to understand Tocqueville’s
account of the passions, especially the mechanism of
the passion of equality.
The Maladies of Equality
Tocqueville claims that equality effects
everything. He tells us that in every age there is
some “peculiar and predominating element that
controls all the rest,” 17 and in democracies that is
equality. Equality of social conditions is the
“creative element from which each particular fact
derives.” 18 Here Tocqueville’s political science is
again similar to Plato’s, though it differs from its
point of departure.  Again in Book VIII of the
12
Republic , Plato tells us that there are “as many
forms of human characters as there are forms of
regimes.” 19  Plato's teaching is this one: if you want
to know what people are like, ask them under what
kind of political regime do they live, for politics
is the most important factor determining human
character. 20 Unlike Plato, Tocqueville sees the origin
of this shaping in social conditions rather than
politics, but like Plato in his analysis of
democracy, he finds the role of equality to be all-
powerful.
According to Tocqueville, equal social conditions
serve to foster and shape the human passions in ways
that may not be compatible with freedom. First,
equality tends to lower human aspirations. In his
melancholy moods when he laments the passing of
aristocracy, this is Tocqueville’s fundamental
complaint about democracy. In democratic times, as
the differences between men become smaller and
smaller, the notion of honour grows feeble, and when
these differences disappear, “honour will vanish
too.” 21  More generally, “heroic devotion and any
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other very exalted, brilliant, and pure virtues”
become increasingly rare, there is neither great
learning nor refinement nor genius. 22  Here,
Tocqueville’s  critique is far more restrained than
that of Plato, who tells us that equality will spread
so far in democracies as to stamps out virtue
entirely by making equality the standard of all
social relations: children will have no shame or fear
of their parents, students will not respect their
teachers.  Even every ass becomes equal to a man:
horses and donkeys will feel completely free to bump
into anyone they “happen to meet on the roads if he
doesn’t stand aside.” 23
But while Tocqueville’s critique of democracy is
more even-handed than Plato’s, he agrees with Plato
about equality’s force. In his diagnosis, equality
may lead to two kinds of overarching maladies, two
chief illnesses that together serve to lower human
aspiration:
One must admit that equality, while it brings great benefits
to mankind, opens the door...to very dangerous instincts.  It
tends to isolate men from each other so that each thinks only
of himself.  It lays the soul open to an inordinate love of
material pleasure. 24
14
But why does democracy lead to such effects?  To
begin with, why does democracy favour the taste for
physical pleasures and why is materialism a
particularly dangerous malady in such times?
Tocqueville explains that desire for material goods
increases in democracies because of the instability
and anxiety of such times. The aristocrat, whose
tastes and needs for physical comfort are “satisfied
without trouble or anxiety,” naturally turns his
attention to other pursuits. 25 The democratic citizen,
to the contrary, lives in an age when fortunes are
always won and lost. In such times, Tocqueville
writes, “the poor conceive an eager desire to acquire
comfort, and the rich think of the danger of losing
it...the owners [of fortunes] never win them without
effort or indulge in them without anxiety.” 26  But
again Tocqueville’s account seems incomplete here.
Though his remarks about anxiety seem plausible, his
contention about democratic attachment to material
goods is more problematic.  For example, Montesquieu,
to the contrary, writes that healthy democracies are
characterised by frugality, both because of
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equality’s tendency to promote distributive policies
and because equality makes impossible the acquisition
of great fortunes. 27 And while Montesquieu
acknowledges that laws are necessary to promote such
habits, his account of equality’s natural tendencies
is still very different from that of Tocqueville.
Here Plato again is instructive, for he provides a
theory explaining Tocqueville’s assertion that
democracy leads to materialism.
According to Plato, democratic belief in equality
will eventually encompass not merely political and
moral belief, but taste as well. For the democratic
removal of all hierarchies levels not only all social
relations, but ultimately all separations between
what is low and what is high, indeed, all we think
of, or evaluate as either noble or base. Plato writes
that if someone should ask a democratic man what is
valuable, whether there are some pleasures or desires
that are good and bad, better or worse, he will reply
that “they are all alike and must be honoured on an
equal basis.” 28 The practical result of this equality
is a turn to the body, to materialism. For if
16
democracy holds everything as equivalent, the most
readily available pleasures - or the pleasures of the
body, the taste for physical comfort, will become not
only most commonly, but also legitimately, sought.
This is Plato’s account of democratic
materialism, but is it Tocqueville’s? We need not
infer Tocqueville’s familiarity with Plato. Rather,
it is sufficient that Plato provides a theory that
seems consistent with, and fills in the background to
Tocqueville’s concern about materialism in democratic
times. Plato best explains the argument that
Tocqueville himself does not provide.
But why is this turn to materialism dangerous for
liberty?  Tocqueville writes:
While man takes delight in this proper and legitimate quest
for prosperity, there is danger that in the end he may lose
the use of his sublimest faculties and that, bent on improving
everything around him, he may at length degrade himself.
That, and nothing else, is the peril.” 29
Tocqueville is more than merely a prophet of doom
here. He claims that a healthy liberal democracy
requires its citizens be politically active, vigorous
ones concerned with their own betterment: he tells us
that there has never been a great nation without a
great people.  And this is not merely a question of
17
greatness, but also of survival.  For an increased
attention to material prosperity may lead to consider
political activity a “tiresome” and “distracting”
bother, and so to a dangerous neglect of politics,
allowing for the possibility of despotism. 30
But while equality tends to lower mankind’s hopes
and aspirations, it is also dangerous for another
reason: its tendency to isolation and separation.
Despotism, as Tocqueville learned from Montesquieu,
demands above all such separation of human beings,
for isolation is the best guarantee of
powerlessness. 31 And because isolation is the
necessary feature of despotic government and because
equality has a tendency to lead to it, equality may
be very dangerous. Again, Tocqueville’s argument is
not simple, because equality not only divides but
also unites at the same time. On one hand, as social
hierarchies disappear, democratic peoples become far
less divided than ever. Equality of social conditions
leads human beings to identify emotionally and
intellectually with each other as never before.  In
an egalitarian age, it is no longer possible for
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someone like the aristocrat Madame Sevigné , whom
Tocqueville  quotes at length, to blandly describe the
weather and the torturing of peasants in one breathe,
to say how hanging and breaking them upon a wheel
will “teach them to respect the governors...and never
throw stones into [our] gardens.” 32  For in democratic
times, “there is no misery that [a human being]
cannot readily understand,” 33 an understanding that is
combined with pity, the universal sentiment that
Rousseau describes as natural to all mankind.  Yet,
while equality may allow for immediate identification
and pity, “a general compassion for all the human
race,” 34 equality also drives human beings apart. For,
more than ever, it focuses the individual’s attention
on himself.
Stendhal’s Mirror: Democratic Self-Preoccupation
Tocqueville’s contemporary, Stendhal, describes
the novelist’s art as one of furnishing a moveable
mirror for the reader to recognise himself as he
turns the pages. In Tocqueville’s analysis of
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equality, this mirror becomes larger than ever, for
democracy gives rise to unprecedented self-
preoccupation. Or as Tocqueville famously writes,
each is “forever thrown back alone on himself, and
the danger is that he may be shut up in the solitude
of his own heart.” 35
There are several reasons for this increased
self-attention, the first of which are philosophical.
In one of his notes, Tocqueville describes the
history of modern philosophy as essentially
democratic. 36 Elaborating this thesis in the chapter
in Democracy in America entitled, Concerning The
Philosophical Approach of the Americans, he explains
that while he is hardly ever studied, the precepts of
Descartes are followed there more than anywhere.
Descartes, of course, begins his philosophical method
with the adjunction that his aim is “to seek no
knowledge other than that which could be found in
myself.” 37 And this command is a democratic one,
because, as Tocqueville explains, now philosophy
demands of the individual, each and every  individual,
to use his “own judgement as the most apparent and
20
accessible test of truth.” 38 This emphasis on the
individual is not restricted merely to philosophical
reflection for modern politics also shares the same
individual point of departure. The idea of the social
contract, whether it is in Hobbes’, Locke’s or
Rousseau’s formulation, is based on a voluntary
coming together of men. It begins with the
individual, one who joins in the body politic on the
basis of self-interested calculation. 39
Yet this philosophical and political emphasis on
the importance of individual judgement becomes
dangerous.  Here Tocqueville is again paradoxical,
showing how characteristics of the new democratic
world both prepare the way for freedom and take it
away at the same time. Tocqueville observes that an
important current of scepticism also accompanies
modern philosophy. Scepticism may be described as the
most democratic of philosophies - it makes all
judgements equally uncertain, equally distant from
the truth. But in a sceptical age, not only is all
authority discredited, even the individual’s own
judgement is called into question.  And so, the
21
freedom of judgement that is prepared for through
modern philosophy is, at the same time, taken away
from it through the rise of doubt. In such times of
scepticism, Tocqueville warns, “men ignobly give up
thinking at all” and may “easily fall back into a
complete and brutish indifference about the future.”
Such a state, says Tocqueville, “inevitably enervates
the soul, and relaxing the springs of the will,
prepares a people for bondage.” 40
Tocqueville also cites sociological reasons for
this increased individualism. Democratic man longer
orients his life by the decrees, commands and values
of his superiors in a fixed social hierarchy:
“democracy breaks the chain and frees each link.” 41
Tocqueville best illustrates the mechanism of these
changes in describing how the relations between
masters and servants are altered by democracy. While
in aristocracies, masters and servants were joined
together in a symbiotic relation of protection and
obedience, honour and respect, in democracies the
relations formed are purely contractual one of
interest.  As a result, masters and servants are no
22
longer joined to each other as they were before, and
though each is recognised as equal now, each thinks
only of himself, “their souls remain apart.” 42
    There are also economic reasons for this
increased self-attention. Equality destroys privilege
but brings with it competition, insecurity and
anxiety, and thus greater self-preoccupation.  For
“when all men are more or less equal and are
following the same path, it is very difficult for any
of them to walk faster and get out beyond the uniform
crowd surrounding and hemming them in.” Moreover:
As the principle of equality quietly penetrates deep into the
institutions and manners of the country, the rules of
advancement become more inflexible and advancement itself
slower...all men, whatever their capacities are forced through
the same sieve, and all without discrimination are made to
pass a host of preliminary tests, wasting their youth and
suffocating their imagination. 43
Competition naturally demands extraordinary self-
attention. For this reason, because their lives are
constantly filled with a host of worries, Tocqueville
describes the Americans as very serious-minded
people. 44
23
The Psychology of Equality
In addition to the philosophical, sociological
and economic factors in the democrat’s greater self-
preoccupation, Tocqueville also presents
psychological ones.  And these behavioral mechanisms
are the key to understanding why Tocqueville thinks
that democratic peoples have a stronger attachment to
equality than liberty.
 Accordin g to Tocqueville, equality appeals to,
and strengthens, what he claims is one of the
strongest passions: vanity, or pride.  Equality
appeals to human pride, for the equality of social
conditions teaches that every man is as good as
anyone else. And this teaching is strengthened by the
notion of the sovereignty of the people: every man is
given an equal say in governing, further confirming
that he is just as valuable, just as important as
everyone else. Individual pride is also strengthened
by the philosophical underpinning of the dogma of
popular sovereignty: the teaching that all are equal
in the essential capacities of reasoning and
24
judgement. Equality thus swells human pride, and
human vanity. The democratic man begins to think -
and justifiably so, that he is equal to everyone else
in EVERY respect. But this promise of equality is
belied in fact.  Though he is told he is equal, he
soon sees that in reality he is far from equal: some
are more successful, wealthier than others. The dogma
of equality, which takes hold of the imagination -
and thus feeds his hopes that he REALLY is equal to
everyone furnishes him with perpetual dreams which
will be perpetually unfulfilled, and so:
[Democrats] will never get the equality they long for.  That
is a quality which ever retreats before them without getting
quite out of sight, and as it retreats it beckons them on to
pursue. Every instant they think they will catch it, and each
time it slips through their fingers.  They see it close enough
to know its charms, but they do not get near enough to enjoy
it, and they will be dead before they have fully relished its
delights. 45
This explains why Tocqueville claims that democratic
peoples will always be restless, and why it is that
equality is psychologically very taxing: the
“constant strife between the desires inspired by
equality and the means it supplies to satisfy them
harasses and wearies the mind.” 46 Tocqueville’s
account of democratic equality is Hobbes’ dream come
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true: a world of restless desire after desire ending
only in death.
The ephemeral nature of equality also explains
Tocqueville’s description of the base kind of
equality.  We should now see that this equality is
not essentially a sign of meanness or baseness.
Tocqueville tells us that human beings cannot live
questioning everything, that “it can never happen
that there are no dogmatic beliefs, that is to say,
opinions which men take on trust without
discussion.” 47 And in democratic ages, this
fundamental dogma is equality; it is the one
principle that is never called into question.
Moreover, if we recall Tocqueville’s  remarks about
the power of democratic majorities, that he knows no
country where there is “less independence of mind and
true freedom of discussion than in America,“ 48 then it
should come as no surprise that when the democratic
man encounters inequalities in fact  his first desire
will be to wish to lower those who seem superior to
his own level. For he cannot accept, and legitimately
so, that the other would naturally not be his equal.
26
His envy is naturally and understandably aroused, for
this inequality jars with the dogma of equality he
believes.
We should also then better understand
Tocqueville’s  claim that the more equal social
conditions, the greater will be the longing for
equality, that “the flames of democratic passion
blaze brighter the less fuel there is to feed them,” 49
for now each sign of inequality not only becomes far
more apparent than ever, but it also disturbs the
cherished imagination of equality - an imagination
that is both constantly fed and constantly
unsatisfied.
The perpetually unfulfilled nature of equality
not only predisposes to a lowering of human
aspiration, but it also points to the second of
Tocqueville’s diagnoses of democratic maladies: the
separation and isolation of democratic human beings.
Equality leads to two contradictory instincts.  On
one hand it stimulates pride, giving democratic man
confidence and pride that he is equal to all,
equality also widens the scope of comparison. Unlike
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one living in an aristocratic age who naturally
compares himself only with those who are of similar
social status - a status that is fixed and
unalterable - the democratic man is led to compare
himself to everyone, for the removal of all fixed
social hierarchies also removes all barriers to the
imagination. And this comparison is overwhelming; it
tends to make the democratic man feel insignificant
and weak. And so, “the same equality which makes him
independent of each separate citizen leaves him
isolated and defenceless in the face of the
majority.” 50  Equality thus may foster a sense of
powerlessness.  And this powerlessness may translate
not only into an automatic deferring to the opinion
of the majority, but also to a general indifference
to politics.
These different factors all se rve as the
mechanisms behind what Tocqueville describes as the
chief vices of democratic times: individualism, a
vice which he defines as a  “a calm and considered
feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate
himself” and to withdraw himself into private life. 51
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Individualism is a vice because for Tocqueville
liberty does not mean being left alone to do whatever
one would like. This does not mean that Tocqueville
is against the flowering of individuality - the
virtue with which his friend John Stuart Mill was so
enamoured.  To the contrary, his concerns about the
general lowering and confirming tendencies of
democracy all lead him to hope that human beings
better themselves but not that these private concerns
entirely overwhelm public ones. For Tocqueville,
liberty is not independence; to the contrary, liberty
is understood as demanding active political
participation.
This is Tocqueville’s diagnosis of the potential
maladies of democracy.  How then does Tocqueville
answer our question on the relation of equality to
liberty?  While Tocqueville may claim that equality
understood as a social state is an undetermined
category, one that may lead to two very different
destinations, either liberty or despotism, our
exposition of equality understood as a passion might
seem far less undetermined. The passion of equality
29
seems naturally to tend to isolation and to the
lowering of human aspiration, and thus to prepare the
ground for despotism.  To be sure, Tocqueville’s
account of the passion of equality is not entirely
one sided.  Despite his pessimism, he also gives
contrary examples. He tells us of the American
businessman who reacts to the superior performance of
a competitor not by wishing to lower his competitor
to his own level, but by rising to the challenge.
More generally, he writes that while equality may
lower human sights, it also may raise them at the
same time, for the breaking down of all barriers that
equality effectuates also suggests the infinite
perfectibility of man. Alongside with his description
of the lowering tendencies of equality, he also says
that mores become more gentle, humane, habits become
more orderly, cruelty and violence rare, brutality in
taste disappears, general cultural ignorance
diminishes. However, Tocqueville still gives far
greater weight to the maladies engendered by equality
rather than to its virtues.  Nonetheless, this still
does not mean that the relation between equality and
30
freedom is not an undetermined one.  To the contrary,
it merely emphasises the importance of Tocqueville’s
declaration at the beginning of Democracy in America
that a new political science is required for the new
democratic world: the passion of equality demands
many cures, for unchecked it tends toward many kinds
of ailments.
    The cures Tocqueville proposes for democracy’s
maladies are well known, and cannot serve as part of
our exposition here - political participation, a free
and active press, the importance of associations,
juries, lawyers, administrative decentralisation,
religion, the protection of formalities, particularly
rights.  What is less emphasised, is Tocqueville’s
concern not for the division but for the general
lowering towards which democracy tends, and his
efforts to counteract such tendencies. Tocqueville is
not the aristocrat content to look down upon
democracy.  To the contrary, he writes that his first
duty is to educate and ennoble democratic man - to
give human beings a higher idea of themselves and of
humanity.
31
Today Tocqueville is enjoying a tremendous
renaissance.  Whether it is in America, France or
Italy, the amount of attention given to Tocqueville
is greater than ever before.  And his thought is now
appropriated by all kinds of current academic points
of view. Tocqueville is alternatively understood as
conservative, liberal, communitarian, and even post-
modern precursor. 52 This should not come as a great
surprise, for like any great thinker, the treasure
chest of his thought is rich enough to furnish
clothing for a wide variety of interpretations.  This
is particularly so because Tocqueville is always
attentive to the different and often contradictory
sides of every phenomenon, warning “one of the most
familiar weaknesses of the human mind is to want to
reconcile conflicting principles and to buy peace at
the cost of logic.” 53 To this list of interpretations,
we now may add one more: to recognise Tocqueville as
a master psychologist, who perhaps better than any
political thinker since Plato, reveals to us the
mechanisms of the passion of equality, the springs
which motivate and move the democratic soul.
32
                                         
1This position is perhaps most famously expressed by Isaiah
Berlin, who writes:
Faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims
equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others...The ends of men
are many and not all of them are in principle compatible with
each other...  (And so), The extent of a man’s or people’s
liberty to choose as they desire must be weighted against the
claims of many other values, of which equality, or justice, or
security, or public order are perhaps the most obvious
examples.” From “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on
Liberty  Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), pp.167, 168-70.
2This list is by no means exhaustive.  For a fine introductory
summary of varieties of opposing positions claiming either a
harmony or conflict between the principles of liberty and
equality see S. Lukes, “Equality and Liberty: Must they
Conflict” in Morality and Conflict in Politics (Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1991), pp.51-70.
3Ibid. p.51.
4Tocqueville’s remarks in 1847 about the spread of equality in
France are remarkably prescient.  He wrote that while the
French revolution abolished all privileges and destroyed all
exclusive rights, it had however, allowed one to continue:
that or property. He predicted that the future battlefield of
equality would become property. In 1848, Marx issued his
Communist Manifesto. See Pierre Gilbert, ed., Egalitè Sociale
et Libertè politique (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1977) pp.37-42.
5Intro.  p.12 .  All references from Tocqueville, unless
otherwise noted, are from Democracy in America,  the Mayer
edited English translation. Trans. G. Lawrence. (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969).
6Ch.2, Sect. 6.
7II ,I,16, p.482.
8E.g. See Jean-Claude Lamberti  Tocqueville  and the Two
Democracies, trans. A. Goldhammer, (Harvard University Press,
1989) pp. 15-18.  For a criticism of Tocqueville’s vagueness
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